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Considering the eﬀects of the contractor’s conﬂict behaviors on the project beneﬁt, a decision model between the owner and
contractor’s conﬂict behaviors in construction projects was constructed using the principal-agent theory and game theory. *e
model was analyzed under nonconﬂicting and conﬂicting conditions, and a numerical simulation and example analysis were
proposed to verify the constructed model’s conclusion. *e results showed that the eﬀort levels of the owner and contractor not
only relate to beneﬁt-sharing coeﬃcient and eﬀort outcome coeﬃcient but also depend on the contractor’s ability of converting the
conﬂict into beneﬁt and the loss caused by conﬂict behaviors. A higher ability of converting conﬂicts into beneﬁts and lower levels
of the loss caused by conﬂict behaviors for the contractor lead to lower levels of the net beneﬁt of the owner, conversely higher
levels of the net beneﬁt of the contractor. Balancing the contractor’s ability of converting conﬂicts into beneﬁts and the loss caused
by conﬂict behaviors lead to a more reasonable risk allocation between the owner and contractor, improving the eﬀort level and
net beneﬁt. To add value to the construction project, the owner should establish an impartial and reasonable beneﬁt-sharing
mechanism, optimize the owner and contractor’s resource arrangement, maximize the positive eﬀect of conﬂict on project
beneﬁts, and avoid the negative eﬀect of conﬂict. Few studies to date have investigated the eﬀects of conﬂict behaviors on project
beneﬁts in terms of modeling and simulation in construction projects. As such, this study bridges this gap and contributes
signiﬁcant theoretical and practical insights about managing conﬂict behaviors in an interorganizational context, thus enhancing
performance in construction projects.
1. Introduction
A typical construction project involves numerous project-
based organizations, including the owner, the contractor, the
subcontractor, the designer, and the consultant [1]. *is
creates a complex adaptive system with common objectives.
*e resources exchange and knowledge transfers occur
between diﬀerent participants during the project imple-
mentation. *e heterogeneity of diverse participants in-
evitably leads to project conﬂicts. Losses caused by conﬂicts
with untimely and inappropriate solutions account for ap-
proximately 3–5% of the total project investment [2]. Project
conﬂicts involving project-based organizations occur along
with the project life cycle occur from the initial stage to the
operational stage. Because of these conﬂicts, project-based
organizations experience an increasingly negative relation-
ship, particularly between the owner and the contractor [3].
*ese adversarial behaviors include disparities between the
owner and contractor, the objective conﬂict between the
owner and contractor, and contention about resources based
on diﬀerent objectives. *ese behaviors consistently lead to
disputes and negotiations between the owner and con-
tractor, making it diﬃcult to achieve an ideal cooperative
eﬀect [4]. Furthermore, these adversarial behaviors consis-
tently lead to time and cost overruns, and complicate
achievement of project objectives [5]. A critical factor for
these behaviors is the absence of a conﬂict management
mechanism, especially between the owner and contractor.
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*erefore, more attention should be paid to investigate the
occurrence of conﬂicts and mechanisms for managing it.
Managing construction projects inevitably involves con-
tracts between the owner and contractor. Contracts are
usually incomplete due to the inherent nature of construction
projects; these projects have complex and uncertain trans-
actions and processes, result in single products, and are
unique—they only happen once [6]. *ese contracts signif-
icantly impact project success, particularly on projects in-
volving more complex construction technologies and more
speciﬁc divisions of work. All the eﬀorts of project-based
organizations are centered on project performance; in-
consistencies in objectives, knowledge, and beneﬁts lead to
conﬂicts, thereby negatively impacting performance [7, 8].
Project participants are interdependent of each other, con-
sistently leading to conﬂicts due to the diversity of knowledge
and beneﬁts [9]. Furthermore, the diﬀerent core capabilities,
information asymmetry, and unclear rights and responsi-
bilities between participants also lead to conﬂicts [10].
*is study constructed a decision model using game
theory to examine conﬂict behaviors between the owner and
contractor. In this model, the contractor is assumed to
trigger the conﬂict behavior. *e owner receives and re-
sponses to the conﬂict behavior. *erefore, the model can be
used to assess: (i) under what conditions the contractor will
trigger the conﬂict behavior; (ii) under what conditions the
contractor can obtain a beneﬁt from the conﬂict behavior;
and (iii) how the owner can guard against the loss caused by
the conﬂict behavior. Previous studies focused on the factors
inﬂuencing conﬂicts and their eﬀects on performance using
empirical data. Few studies, however, have investigated the
internal mechanism in terms of modeling and simulations
in construction projects. *is study bridges this gap and
contributes signiﬁcant theoretical and practical insights
about conﬂicts occurring in an interorganizational con-
text.*ese insights can enhance management performance
in construction projects.
2. Literature Review
Conﬂict is a phenomenon that occurs when there are dif-
ferent beliefs, thoughts, and beneﬁts between two or more
individuals and is a complicated social and psychological
phenomenon involving diﬀerent levels and dimensions [11].
*ese diﬀerent types and levels of conﬂict can interact and be
interdependent [12]. Recently, researchers have introduced
conﬂict theory to the ﬁeld of construction project manage-
ment. *is study area has emerged because of the interde-
pendencies and diversity between participants and imperfect
management mechanisms, which may cause conﬂicts in
construction projects [13].
*e traditional deﬁnition of conﬂict emphasizes the
opposition of objectives within a competitive background,
and proposes that conﬂict originates from the opposite
relationships with respect to beneﬁts. Resource scarcity and
the divergence of objectives are baseline factors assumed by
this deﬁnition. *e main result is that one party achieves its
own objectives at the cost of other party’s beneﬁt. Conﬂict
behaviors between an owner and contractor, the research
object for this study, reﬂect a type of interorganizational
conﬂict, namely, the conﬂict behavior between stakeholders
in construction projects. Sources of conﬂicts in construction
projects include limited public resources, diﬀerent un-
derstandings of the project plan, and diﬀerent task priorities
[14, 15]. Additionally, the industrial characteristics of the
building industry create sources of conﬂicts, including the
discreteness of the construction link, low eﬃciencies, and
cost overruns [16]. *erefore, conﬂict in construction projects
is an interaction between diﬀerent participants with diﬀerent
perceptions and viewpoints on a process or task. Conﬂict
results from participant-related factors, project-related factors,
and issues related to communication, beneﬁt allocation, and
trust. *e background of projects provided a suitable envi-
ronment to analyze conﬂict, because conﬂicts in construction
projects are behaviorally related, and signiﬁcantly aﬀect
performance.
Conﬂict can have constructive and destructive eﬀects on
performance. In construction projects, the traditional view of
conﬂict is that it causes destructive eﬀects. Xue et al. [17]
proposed that performance is an interactive result of col-
laboration between multiple parties; because conﬂicts hinder
collaboration, they are detrimental to performance. Conﬂicts
can strain the owner and contractor relationship, impeding
eﬀective communication, and resulting in cost and time
overruns, and low quality and satisfaction [18, 19]. However,
the speciﬁc tasks of the project were unconventional. Conﬂicts
can provide diﬀerent views and knowledge with which to
address tasks, improving decision quality [20, 21].
*e eﬀects of conﬂicts on performance may relate to
management strategies; diﬀerent strategies have diﬀerent
results [22]. Chen [23] explored the positive and negative
eﬀects in project value creation and found that the total life
cycle adjusted the task conﬂict and project value. Anderson
and Polkinghorn [24] discussed the importance of the conﬂict
resolution skills and methods in constructing the Woodrow
Wilson bridge; they concluded that process conﬂict had the
greatest inﬂuence on performance. Brockman [25] surveyed
74 participants in diﬀerent construction projects; 56% of
respondents proposed that relationship conﬂict had de-
structive eﬀects on performance. Puck and Pregernig [26]
conducted a long-term survey of 92 construction teams,
arguing that diﬀerent types of task conﬂicts had diﬀerent
eﬀects on performance. Chen et al. [3] concluded that
conﬂicts between the owner and contractor were repre-
sented by an inverted U shape on cost performance; only
moderate degrees of conﬂict could improve performance.
Chen et al. [27] proposed that emotional conﬂicts eﬀec-
tively mediated decisions and philanthropic paternalism,
using empirical data from 108 top managers. Wu [28]
found that process and relationship conﬂicts were nega-
tively related to project success, and task conﬂict con-
tributed to project success.*erefore, there is still equivocal
how conﬂicts aﬀect performance in construction projects;
for example, there is inadequate information about the
internal interaction mechanism of conﬂict. Researchers
have validated the constructive and destructive eﬀects
on performance using empirical data; however, the in-
teraction mechanism still needs to be discovered and
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analyzed. Modeling and simulation methods are eﬀective
tools to uncover the internal mechanism, due to the in-
herent nature of construction projects.
*is study assumed that the contractor is the triggering
party and can trigger conﬂicts through claims and project
changes [29]. *e owner directly bears the consequence of
conﬂicts, while conﬂict behaviors can be restrained through
reward and penalty mechanism signed in contracts [30]. *e
contractor experiences two consequences of conﬂict behavior:
gain or lose.*erefore, this study constructed a decision model
using game theory to analyze the internal mechanisms of
conﬂict behaviors on performance. *e model analysis and
conclusions can clarify the eﬀect of conﬂict on performance,
and contribute to the development of eﬀective conﬂict man-
agement strategies. *is study contributes signiﬁcant theo-
retical and practical insights to the existing body of knowledge
on conﬂict management.*is study provides a useful reference
for project managers maximize the advantages of the positive
eﬀects of conﬂicts, and avoid the negative eﬀects of conﬂicts.
3. Model Description and Solution
3.1. Model Description. Assume there are two equal project-
based organizations: the owner and the contractor. *ese
organizations cooperate with each other to achieve the suc-
cessful delivery during project implementation. Conﬂicts
between the owner and contractor consistently occur due
to the temporary and dynamic nature of cooperation. *is
study does not consider the time value of money and
proposes the following hypotheses:
(i) *e owner is risk-neutral and the contractor is risk-
averse.*e eﬀort levels of the contractor and owner are
e1 and e2, respectively.*e functions of the cost of eﬀort
for the contractor and owner are expressed as follows:
C ei( ) �
1
2
e
2
i (i � 1, 2). (1)
In this study, the parameter ei is not limited to ei > 0,
which means the eﬀort levels of the contractor and owner
can be less than zero. If this occurs, the cooperation between
the contractor and owner is negative, with neither being
willing to allocate resources. *e coeﬃcients of the cost of
eﬀort for the contractor and the owner are the same and are
assigned as one. Generally, the coeﬃcients of the cost of eﬀort
are not the same and can be other values.*is study focuses on
the eﬀects of conﬂicts on performance; as such, the inﬂuences
of the coeﬃcients of the cost of eﬀort are not included.
(ii) Assume the contractor and owner can balance their
eﬀort level. *e project outcome function can be
written as [31]
R e1, e2( ) � κ1e1 + κ2e2 + ε. (2)
In this expression, the parameters of κ1 > 0 and κ2 > 0 are
the outcome coeﬃcients of eﬀort levels of the contractor and
owner. *e coeﬃcients reﬂect their integrated technology
and management level. *is is manifested by the ability to
transfer input resources to outcomes and is related to staﬀ
quality, operational level, and technological ability [32]. *e
contractor and owner cannot directly observe each other’s
eﬀort level; the levels can be evaluated based on the input
resources and the achievement of objectives. *e parameters
e1, e2, and ε are mutually independent. *e parameter ε is
normally distributed as N(0, σ2), reﬂecting the inﬂuence of
the external uncertainty on the outcome function.
(iii) Assume the owner provides a linear incentive
contract for the contractor, written as S � Ω+
βR(e1, e2). In this equation, the parameter Ω is
a ﬁxed reward the owner provides the contractor.
*is reward is a constant and cannot stimulate the
contractor to adopt a higher level of eﬀort. *us, the
value can be assigned to zero [33]. *e parameter β
is a coeﬃcient of the project outcome sharing and is
within the range 0≤ β≤ 1. *is range reﬂects the
incentive degree of the owner [34]. Additionally,
this study focuses on conﬂict behaviors between the
owner and contractor. *is is a type of cooperative
conﬂict because the owner and contractor cooperate
to achieve successful project delivery, while also
maximizing their own beneﬁts. In this situation,
inconsistent objectives may lead to conﬂict behav-
iors. *is study focuses on conﬂict behaviors during
the construction stage, when the contractor has su-
perior information and can trigger conﬂicts through
project changes and claims.*us, the contractor is the
party that can trigger conﬂicts. In contrast, the owner
can only respond to the conﬂict based on the conﬂict
type and the results.
(iv) When the contractor adopts conﬂict behaviors, the
contractor beneﬁts in two ways. One is the contractual
coeﬃcient of beneﬁt sharing (β) and the other is the
beneﬁt converted through the conﬂict. Assuming
the beneﬁt converted through the conﬂict depends on
the eﬀort levels of the contractor (e1) and the owner
(e2) and the coeﬃcient (μ) of converting conﬂicts to
beneﬁts for the contractor (0< μ< 1). *erefore, the
beneﬁts converted through the conﬂict can be pre-
sented as μe1e2, which are paid by the owner. *e
coeﬃcient of converting conﬂicts to beneﬁts for
the contractor (μ) reﬂects the bargaining ability of
the contractor who is adopting conﬂict behaviors. *e
coeﬃcient relates to the qualiﬁcation, similar project
experiences, and reputation. Additionally, the owner
can adjust the level of eﬀort to aﬀect the beneﬁts
converted through the conﬂict. Generally, high values
for the coeﬃcient of converting conﬂicts to beneﬁts and
eﬀorts of the contractor lead to lower levels of eﬀort for
the owner, even a negative value of the eﬀort level.
Furthermore, when the contractor adopts conﬂict be-
haviors, the owner must spend time to address the conﬂict
and prevent the loss. *is may lead to the owner distrusting
the contractor. Under this condition, adopting conﬂict
behaviors may lead to both current and future losses for the
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contractor. Current losses include failures of project changes
and claims and accelerated costs due to an extended conﬂict
resolution period. Future losses include losing opportunities
for future cooperation, and a lower reputation due to an
unsuitable conﬂict environment. Assume the coeﬃcient of
loss caused by conﬂict behaviors is η and satisﬁes the
condition of 0< η< 1. *e loss caused by conﬂict behaviors
is ηe1; this variable relates to the eﬀort level, input resources,
and cooperative attitude of the contractor. *is reﬂects the
fact that higher levels of eﬀort lead to higher levels of loss for
the contractor adopting conﬂicts.*e contractor may trigger
conﬂict behaviors when μe1e2 > ηe1. In other words, the
contractor triggers conﬂict behaviors only when the con-
tractor estimates the beneﬁts exceed the loss brought by the
conﬂicts.
*erefore, when there are conﬂict behaviors between the
owner and contractor, the function of net beneﬁts of the
contractor can be expressed as
U1 � β κ1e1 + κ2e2( )− 12e21 + μe1e2 − ηe1 − 12 ρβ2σ2. (3)
*e function of net beneﬁts of the owner can be written
as
U2 � (1− β) κ1e1 + κ2e2( )− 12e22 − μe1e2 + ηe1. (4)
*e function of project outcome can be written as
U � κ1e1 + κ2e2 − 12e21 − 12e22 − 12 ρβ2σ2. (5)
3.2. Model Solution
3.2.1. Solution under Nonconﬂicting Behavior Condition. To
compare the eﬀects of conﬂict behaviors on performance,
the proposed model ﬁrst considered nonconﬂicting be-
haviors. Under this condition, the function of net beneﬁts of
the contractor and the owner and the function of project
outcome can be written as
U1 � β κ1e1 + κ2e2( )− 12e21 − 12 ρβ2σ2, (6)
U2 � (1− β) κ1e1 + κ2e2( )− 12e22, (7)
U � κ1e1 + κ2e2 − 12e21 − 12e22 − 12 ρβ2σ2. (8)
*eﬁrst partial derivatives of e1 and e2 were calculated, and
the values were set to zero. *is led to the following equation:
zU1
ze1
� βκ1 − e1 � 0,
zU2
ze2
� (1− β)κ2 − e2 � 0. (9)
We solve the above simultaneous equation for e1 and e2
as follows:
e
∗∗
1 � βκ1,
e
∗∗
2 � (1− β)κ2. (10)
According to the extremum attributes of functions, the
second partial derivatives ofU is z2U/zβ2 � −κ21 − κ22 − ρσ2 < 0.
Substituting (10) into (8), we calculated the partial derivatives of
β. *e value was then set to zero and solved as
β∗∗ � κ21
κ21 + κ22 + ρσ2
. (11)
3.2.2. Solution under Conﬂicting Behavior Condition. For (3)
and (4), the ﬁrst partial derivatives of e1 and e2 were cal-
culated, respectively. *e values were then set to zero, and
the following equation was obtained:
zU1
ze1
� βκ1 − e1 + μe2 − η � 0,
zU2
ze2
� (1− β)κ2 − e2 − μe1 � 0. (12)
To solve the above simultaneous equation for e1 and e2,
we obtain
e
∗
1 �
κ1β− η( ) + μκ2(1− β)
1 + μ2
,
e
∗
2 �
κ2(1− β)− μ κ1β− η( )
1 + μ2
.
(13)
According to the extremum attributes of functions, the
second partial derivatives of U was z2U/zβ2 � −((κ21 + κ22)/
(1 + μ2))− ρσ2 < 0. *e partial derivatives of β were calculated
by substituting (13) into (5). *e value was then set to zero and
solved as
β∗ � κ21 + 2μκ1κ2 − ηκ1
κ21 + κ22 + ρ 1 + μ2( )σ2
. (14)
4. Model Analysis and Simulations
4.1. Model Analysis
Proposition 1. Under the condition of nonconﬂicting be-
haviors, the eﬀort levels of the contractor and the owner do not
relate to one another. Instead, they are related to their own
outcome coeﬃcients of eﬀort levels and the contractual co-
eﬃcient of beneﬁt sharing. For the contractor, a high level of
beneﬁt sharing provided by the owner and a high outcome
coeﬃcient contribute to a high eﬀort level. When the project
beneﬁt is ﬁxed, a high level of beneﬁt sharing leads to a low
beneﬁt for the owner. ?is leads to a low eﬀort level by the
owner. ?erefore, when designing the incentive mechanism for
the project operation, the owner needs to determine a rea-
sonable coeﬃcient of beneﬁt sharing for the owner, based on the
outcome coeﬃcient and contractor eﬀort. In this situation, if
the owner adopts an optimal incentive method for the con-
tractor, the speciﬁc project can achieve a stable and balanced
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state. It is relatively easy to design an incentive mechanism
under the condition of nonconﬂicting behaviors.
Proof. One has
ze1
zβ
� κ1 > 0,
ze2
zβ
� −κ2 < 0,
ze2
z(1− β) � κ2 > 0. (15)
Proposition 2. Under conditions with conﬂicting behaviors,
the eﬀort levels of the contractor and the owner are related to
each other. Eﬀort levels are also related to their own outcome
coeﬃcients of eﬀort levels, and the contractual coeﬃcient of
beneﬁt sharing (Figure 1). For the contractor, a high level of
eﬀort by the owner can motivate the contractor to also adopt
a high level of eﬀort. For the owner, a high level of eﬀort by
the contractor tends to decrease the owner’s enthusiasm to
adopt a high level of eﬀort. Because of the coeﬃcients of
beneﬁt sharing, and the ability for conﬂicts to be converted to
beneﬁts, the owner needs to provide a higher level of beneﬁt
sharing to motivate the contractor to adopt higher levels of
eﬀort. A high level of eﬀort by the contractor, combined with
a greater ability to convert conﬂicts to beneﬁts, will lead to
more beneﬁts for the contractor. ?is increases the beneﬁts
for the contractor, but damages owner beneﬁts, leading to
a lower level of eﬀort for the owner. Additionally, because of
the coeﬃcient of loss caused by conﬂicts, the contractor will
balance beneﬁt and loss when triggering conﬂicts. ?is leads
the contractor to decide to adopt a high or low level of eﬀort.
As with the condition of nonconﬂicting behaviors, a high
level of beneﬁt sharing contributes to a high level of eﬀort by
the contractor, while leading to a lower level of eﬀort by the
owner.
Proof. One has
e1 � μe2 + βκ1 − η ze1zβ � κ1 − μκ21 + μ2 > 0
e2 � −μe1 +(1− β)κ2 ze2zβ � − κ2 + μκ11 + μ2 < 0. (16)
Proposition 3. Under the condition of conﬂicting behaviors,
the contractor determines the eﬀort level, by considering the
beneﬁt and loss caused by conﬂict behaviors. Generally, more
losses caused by conﬂicts lead to lower levels of eﬀort by the
contractor. For the contractor, the beneﬁts of converting
conﬂicts relate to the owner’s eﬀort level; as such, the con-
tractor will examine and weigh the ability of the beneﬁt
achieved by convert conﬂict behaviors to beneﬁts. ?is de-
termines the reasonable eﬀort level. For the owner, a greater
ability to convert conﬂicts for the beneﬁt of the contractor
and lower losses caused by conﬂicts lead to lower levels of
eﬀort by the owner. ?is reﬂects the fact that conﬂict be-
haviors have constructive or destructive eﬀects on the ben-
eﬁts for the owner and contractor. Whether the contractor
chooses to trigger conﬂicts or not depends on the absolute
values of constructive or destructive eﬀects. If triggering
conﬂicts bring beneﬁts to the contractor, the contractor will
adopt conﬂict behaviors. If triggering conﬂicts cause losses to
the contractor, the contractor will not adopt conﬂict be-
haviors. ?is prompts the owner to adopt eﬀective bonus and
penalty methods to decrease the loss caused by conﬂicts. ?e
owner should observe information about eﬀort levels, re-
source allocations, and beneﬁt sharing by the contractor, and
subsequently formulate an eﬀective bonus and penalty
mechanism.
Proof. One has
ze∗1
zμ
�
1− μ2( )κ2(1− β)− 2μ κ1β− η( )
1 + μ2( )2
> 0 ze∗1
zη
� − 1
1 + μ2
< 0
ze∗2
zμ
� − 1− μ2( ) κ1β− η( ) + 2μκ2(1− β)
1 + μ2( )2
< 0 ze∗2
zη
�
1
1 + μ2
> 0. (17)
Proposition 4. Under the condition of conﬂicting behaviors,
the coeﬃcient of beneﬁt sharing depends on the outcome ability
of the owner and contractor and also depends on the coeﬃcients
of converting conﬂict behaviors to beneﬁts and the loss caused
by conﬂicts. Higher levels of converting conﬂict behaviors to
beneﬁts and lower losses caused by conﬂicts lead to a higher
level of beneﬁt sharing for the owner. ?is lowers the possibility
that the contractor will adopt conﬂict behaviors. One potential
explanation is that conﬂicts can not only beneﬁt the owner but
also simultaneously cause losses to the owner. If the contractor
has a greater ability to convert conﬂicts to beneﬁts, there are
more losses for the owner.?us, if the owner tends to avoid the
loss caused by conﬂicts, the owner will strengthen contractor
incentives. Additionally, when the contractor experiences
higher losses caused by conﬂicts, there are more beneﬁts con-
verted from the conﬂict for the owner. If the owner’s beneﬁts
can be forecasted, the owner will decrease contractor incentives
to enhance its own beneﬁts.
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Proof. One has
zβ∗
zη
 − κ1
κ21 + κ22 + ρ 1 + μ2( )σ2 < 0
zβ∗
zμ
 2κ1κ2 κ
2
1 + κ22 + ρ 1 + μ2( )σ2[ ]− 2μ κ21 + 2μκ1κ2−ηκ1[ ]
κ21 + κ22 + ρ 1 + μ2( )σ2[ ]2 > 2 κ1κ2 − μ( ) κ21 + 2μκ1κ2 − ηκ1[ ]κ21 + κ22 + ρ 1 + μ2( )σ2[ ]2 > 0. (18)
Proposition 5. When a contractor triggers con
ict, that con
ict
may not bring a greater benet. is depends on the contractor’s
own characteristics, such as the outcome coecient of eort, the
ability to convert con
icts to benets, and the eort level. It also
depends on the eort level of the owner.e contractor triggering
con
icts brings a better benet onlywhen η< 2μκ2.is indicates
that the benet from converting the con
icts is greater than the
loss caused by the con
ict. Under this situation, the contractor
will trigger con
icts; otherwise, the contractor will not trigger
con
icts. us, the contractor may enhance its own benet by
triggering con
icts. Consequently, the ownermay increase its own
benet by adopting reasonable con
ict management strategies.
erefore, if the owner can select reasonable con
ictmanagement
strategies, it may create a better project benet.is validates the
hypothesis that con
icts may have a positive eect on project
benets.
Proof. One has
β∗∗ − β∗  κ21
κ21 + κ22 + ρσ2
− κ21 + 2μκ1κ2 − ηκ1
κ21 + κ22 + ρ 1 + μ2( )σ2 > κ1η− 2μκ1κ2κ21 + κ22 + ρ 1 + μ2( )σ2. (19)
4.2. Model Simulations
4.2.1. Eects of Eort Levels of the Owner and Contractor on
Project Benets. Based on (3)–(5), (13), and (14), we set
κ1  5, κ2  4, ρσ2  20, μ  0.6, and η  0.3. We then
simulate the eects of eort levels (e1, e2) on the project
benet (U), the contractor’s net benet (U1), and the owner’s
net benet (U2). Figure 2 shows the results. Figure 2(a) shows
that project benets reach an optimal value only when the
eort levels of the contractor and owner (e∗1 , e∗2 ) achieve
a stable and balanced state. is is consistent with the model
analysis. Figures 2(b) and 2(c) show that the net benets of the
owner and contractor increase as the other parties’ eort level is
enhanced; the outcome of enhancing their own eort levels
is represented by an inverted U curve. is reects the fact
that the contractor will decide whether to trigger conicts,
based on the owner’s eort level. e owner will adjust its
own strategy, based on the contractor’s behavior. us, the
eort levels of the contractor and owner aect each other,
as well as their own net benets. Additionally, for the owner
and contractor, adjusting their own eort levels is critical to
enhancing their own net benets. However, increasing
their own eort levels does not necessarily enhance their
own net benets. is depends on the other parties’ eort
level. us, the owner’s optimal strategy is adjusting its
strategy based on the contractor’s behaviors.
4.2.2. Eects of Coecients of Converting Con
icts to Benets
and the Loss Caused by Con
icts on Eort Levels. Based on
(10), (11), (13), and (14), we set κ1  5, κ2  4, and ρσ2  20.
We then simulate eects of coecients of converting
e1
e1∗∗
e2∗∗
e2
(1 – β)κ2
βκ
1
(a)
e1
e1∗
e2∗
e2
((1 – β)κ2/μ)
(1
–
β)
κ 2
βκ1 – η
(b)
Figure 1: e eort levels of the owner and contractor under dierent conditions.
6 Advances in Civil Engineering
conicts to benets (μ) and the loss caused by conicts (η)
on eort levels (e1, e2), under conicting and nonconicting
conditions. Figure 3 shows the results, demonstrating that
when there are conict behaviors between the contractor
and owner, higher levels of the coecient of converting
conicts to benet (μ) and lower levels of the coecient of
the loss caused by conicts (η) contribute to higher levels
of eort by the contractor. Lower levels of the coecient of
converting conicts to benets (μ) and higher levels of the
coecient of the loss caused by conicts (η) contribute to
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Figure 2: Eects of eort levels of the owner and contractor on project benets. (a) Eects of e1 and e2 onU. (b) Eects of e1 and e2 onU1.
(c) Eects of e1 and e2 on U2.
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Figure 3: Eects of coecients of converting conicts to benet and the loss caused by conicts on eort levels. (a) Eects of μ and η on e1.
(b) Eects of μ and η on e2.
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higher levels of eort of the owner. is is consistent with
Proposition 3. Compared with Figures 3(a) and 3(b), the
eort levels of the contractor and owner under conicting
conditions may exceed their corresponding values under
nonconicting condition. is reects the fact that if con-
icts can bring more benets for the owner and contractor,
both may be willing to initiate conict behaviors. is
also means conict behaviors may have a constructive
eect on project benets, which benets the eort levels of
the owner and contractor. e critical question is whether
the constructive eect simultaneously aects the owner and
contractor. In other words, it creates the question of
whether there is a balanced point (μ∗, η∗) that maximizes
values of (e1, e2). In fact, this situation may be achieved
when considering the eects of dierent types of conicts.
e contractor should consider and control the relation-
ship between the benet and loss caused by conict be-
haviors, adjusting their inuence on the owner’s eort
level. Furthermore, the owner should adjust its strategy to
respond to contractor behaviors. Under these conditions,
conict behaviors between the owner and contractor may
be constructive and contribute to project benets. is
veries the constructive aspect of conict behaviors in
construction projects.
4.2.3. Eects of Coecients of Converting Con
icts to Benet
and the Loss Caused by Con
icts on the Coecient of Benet
Allocation. Based on (11), (13), and (14), we set κ1  5,
κ2  4, and ρσ2  20. We then simulate the eects of the
coecient of converting conicts to benet (μ), and the loss
caused by conicts (η) on the coecient of benet allocation
(β), under conicting and nonconicting conditions. Figure
4 shows the results, demonstrating that conict behaviors
between the contractor and owner lead to higher levels of the
coecient of converting conicts to benet (μ) and lower
levels of the coecient of the loss caused by conicts (η)
contribute to a greater allocation of benets to the con-
tractor. is is consistent with Proposition 4. Compared
with the nonconicting condition, the coecient of
benet allocation (β) may be higher or lower than the
corresponding value with the variation of coecients of
converting conicts to the benet and loss caused by con-
icts. is reects the fact that triggering conict behaviors
would not always benet the contractor; in fact, it may cause
a loss for the contractor. erefore, the contractor should
balance coecients of converting conicts to benet and the
loss caused by conicts and consider the owner’s scoping
strategy. is would lead the contractor to reasonably select
its own behaviors and eort level, with a goal of increasing its
own net benet.
4.2.4. Eects of Coecients of Converting Con
icts to Benet
and the Loss Caused by Con
icts on Project Benets. Based
on (3)–(8), we set κ1  5, κ2  4, ρσ2  20, μ  0.6, and
η  0.3. en, we simulate the eects of the coecients of
converting conicts to benets (μ) and the loss caused by
conicts (η) on the project benet (U), the contractor’s net
benet (U1), and the owner’s net benet (U2) under con-
icting and nonconicting conditions. Figure 5 shows the
results and demonstrates that lower levels of the coecient
of converting conicts to benet (μ) and lower levels of the
coecient of the loss caused by conicts (η) contribute to
greater project benets. Higher levels of the coecient of
converting conicts to benet (μ) and lower levels of the
coecient of the loss caused by conicts (η) contribute to
greater net benets for the contractor. Lower levels of the
coecient of converting conicts to benet (μ) and higher
levels of the coecient of the loss caused by conicts (η)
contribute to greater net benets for the owner. Compared
with Figures 5(b) and 5(c), the net benet of the contractor is
reected in an inverted U shape, with the variation of the
coecient of converting conicts to benet (μ), the owner’s
net benet is represented by an inverted U shape with the
variation of the coecient of the loss caused by conicts (η).
is indicates that if the owner can design a reasonable
conict management mechanism, the contractor can bal-
ance the relationship between the benet and loss caused by
conict behaviors. Under this situation, the destructive eect
of conicts can be avoided, and the constructive eect of
conicts can be introduced. Additionally, compared with
Figures 5(a)–5(c), conict behaviors between the owner and
contractor appear to have constructive eects on project
benets, thus strengthening the net benets for the owner
and contractor.
4.2.5. Numerical Example. In this section, dierent situa-
tions of outcome coecients of the owner and contractor are
addressed to compare the model results. In addition, dif-
ferent situations of the coecients of converting conicts to
benet (μ) and the loss caused by conicts (η) under the
same outcome coecients of the owner and contractor are
calculated. Applying the conict decision model with owner
and contractor parameter values allows the calculation of
eort levels of the owner and contractor, the net benets for
the owner and contractor, the benet allocation coecient,
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Figure 4: Eects of coecients of converting conicts to benet
and the loss caused by conicts on the coecient of benet
allocation.
8 Advances in Civil Engineering
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0 0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
η
μ
U
(a)
–2
–1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0 0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1
η μ
U
1
(b)
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0 0 0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
η μ
U
2
(c)
Figure 5: Eects of coecients of converting con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Table 1: e results of conict decision model between the owner and contractor under dierent situations.
(e1, e2) β U1 U2 U
κ1  5, κ2  4
μ  0, η  0 (2.05, 2.36) 0.41 4.29 8.83 13.12
μ  0.1, η  0.9 (1.69, 1.91) 0.48 2.80 7.75 10.55
μ  0.3, η  0.3 (3.21, 0.30) 0.68 6.08 1.29 7.37
μ  0.3, η  0.6 (2.83, 0.53) 0.66 1.11 6.73 7.84
μ  0.6, η  0.3 (3.20, −1.40) 0.86 4.03 −7.31 −3.28
μ  0.9, η  0.1 (3.72, −2.54) 0.96 3.19 −17.19 −14.00
κ1  4, κ2  4
μ  0, η  0 (1.23, 2.77) 0.31 3.22 7.24 10.46
μ  0.1, η  0.9 (0.83, 2.44) 0.37 2.57 5.79 8.36
μ  0.3, η  0.3 (2.29, 1.04) 0.57 1.74 5.17 6.91
μ  0.3, η  0.6 (1.94, 1.25) 0.54 1.67 5.51 7.18
μ  0.6, η  0.3 (2.13, 0.44) 0.74 3.93 3.28 7.21
μ  0.9, η  0.1 (2.42, −1.47) 0.89 1.76 0.25 2.01
κ1  4, κ2  5
μ  0, η  0 (1.05, 3.69) 0.27 4.70 9.90 14.60
μ  0.1, η  0.9 (0.71, 3.32) 0.32 4.56 8.11 12.67
μ  0.3, η  0.3 (2.28, 1.73) 0.52 4.42 6.61 11.03
μ  0.3, η  0.6 (1.96, 1.95) 0.49 4.28 7.04 11.32
μ  0.6, η  0.3 (2.51, 1.34) 0.71 6.65 2.12 8.77
μ  0.9, η  0.1 (2.89, 0.58) 0.80 2.06 1.22 3.28
Advances in Civil Engineering 9
and the project beneﬁts under diﬀerent situations. Table 1
shows the results.
5. Conclusions and Implications
*is study considered the eﬀects of conﬂict behaviors on
project beneﬁts. Based on the inherent nature of con-
struction projects, this study constructed a decision model
between the owner and contractor’s conﬂict behaviors, then
analyzed the model under conﬂicting and nonconﬂicting
conditions. A simulation and numerical example were
implemented to verify the conclusions from the model
analysis. *e study led to four key results. First, eﬀort levels
for the contractor and owner only relate to coeﬃcients of
beneﬁt sharing and eﬀort outcomes under nonconﬂicting
condition. Eﬀort levels also relate to the coeﬃcients for
converting conﬂicts to beneﬁts and the loss caused by
conﬂicts under conﬂicting condition. Second, higher levels
of the coeﬃcients for converting conﬂicts to beneﬁts and
lower levels of the coeﬃcient of the loss caused by conﬂicts
contribute to a higher level of net beneﬁts for the contractor
and a lower level of net beneﬁts for the owner. *ird, this
study veriﬁed the constructive eﬀect of conﬂict behaviors
between the owner and contractor; conﬂict behaviors may
have constructive eﬀects on the project beneﬁts. *is can
strengthen the net beneﬁts for the owner and contractor.
Fourth, if the owner can design a reasonable conﬂict
management mechanism, the contractor can balance and
control the beneﬁt and loss caused by conﬂicts. *is has the
beneﬁt of strengthening the eﬀort levels for the owner and
contractor, improving project beneﬁts.
Due to complementary core abilities and consistency in
the willingness to cooperate, conﬂict behaviors between the
owner and contractor in construction projects are
cooperative-based conﬂicts. As such, conﬂicts may have
constructive eﬀects on project beneﬁts. *e conclusions of
this study highlight three key implications for project
management. First, the coeﬃcient of beneﬁt allocation de-
pends on two factors: contractor-related factors, such as the
coeﬃcient of eﬀort outcome, converting conﬂicts to beneﬁts;
and project-related factors, such as the project’s external
uncertainty. Facing a complex external project environment
makes it diﬃcult for the owner to evaluate the eﬀort level of
the contractor; as such, the owner may adopt a weak in-
centive intensity. Second, balancing the beneﬁt and loss
caused by conﬂict behaviors can lead to a more reasonable
risk allocation between the owner and contractor [35]. *is
can prompt the owner and contractor to enhance their own
eﬀort levels, achieving improvements in beneﬁts. *ird, the
owner should construct a fair and reasonable beneﬁt-sharing
mechanism and optimize the level of resource input and
allocation between the owner and contractor. *is builds
a trust relationship between the owner and contractor, thus
avoiding the destructive eﬀects of conﬂicts and promoting
constructive eﬀects.
Few studies have emphasized eﬀects of conﬂict on
construction project beneﬁts. *is study constructed a de-
cisionmodel using game theory to bridge this gap.*is study
contributes signiﬁcant theoretical and practical insights to
manage conﬂicts in construction projects. However, an
evaluation of the proposed model and conclusions must also
consider the study’s limitations. First, the proposed model
considers the interorganizational relationship between the
owner and contractor, while the conﬂict relationship may
involve more stakeholders. Second, this study did not ad-
dress diﬀerent types of conﬂicts that may also aﬀect beneﬁts.
In project practice, contractor’s commitment may change as
the project life cycle evolves, and the inﬂuence of conﬂicts on
project beneﬁts may change. *ese limitations highlight
future research directions. In conclusion, this study con-
tributes to the existing knowledge by proposing and vali-
dating a game-based decision model that project managers
can use to address conﬂicts in construction projects. *e
model highlights practical implications, providing a clear
understanding of eﬀects of conﬂict on beneﬁts in con-
struction projects. *e study also provides a theoretical
reference for properly managing conﬂicts among stake-
holders and realizing overall project beneﬁts.
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